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Ethnic Belonging in Laos: 
A Politico-Historical 
Perspective
Grégoire Schlemmer
Introduction
Laos’ population of about six million is characterized by its dis-
concerting ethnic complexity. A total of 49 official ethnic groups are 
officially recognized — of these, the largest group, the (ethnic) Lao, 
accounts for just over half of the population,1 while there may be 
about 10 times as many Lao language speakers in Thailand. It is a 
peculiar situation where many more members of the country’s domi-
nant ethnicity live outside its borders, while minority groups of this 
country, grouped together, almost form the majority of the popula-
tion. Who are these ethnic groups? How can one make sense of the 
reality of such a diversity of people? How do they live together and 
how does the state manage this diversity? These are some of the ques-
tions we would like to address in this chapter, by drawing on existing 
studies and our own field research experience and materials.2
“Ethnic”: An Ambiguous Category
In order to discuss ethnicity, we first need to determine what the 
term covers. This is where the problem begins. Indeed, the meaning 
attributed, explicitly or implicitly, to the notion of ethnicity varies 
depending on audiences and circumstances. These definitions are indi-
cative of biases and issues that are woven around the understanding 
and the organization of populations labeled under this term.
  251
C H A P T E R
10
252 Grégoire Schlemmer
Ethnic Groups, Minorities or Highlanders?
Although everyone is supposed to belong to an ethnic group, the 
term “ethnic” (sonphao), as it is used commonly in the Lao language, 
generally refers to all ethnic groups except the Lao. This is also true 
in many studies by governmental or non-governmental development 
organizations, which represent the main producer and source of infor-
mation in Laos. Most studies dealing with ethnic issues distinguish be-
tween the (ethnic) Lao and all other ethnic groups of Laos. The same 
distinction is applied to the field of tourism: going to see “the ethnic 
groups” means going to see populations that are not ethnically Lao. 
In its common usage, the term “ethnicity” is then associated with the 
minority. But de facto, it also excludes people from different nationali-
ties residing in Laos — primarily, the Chinese and the Vietnamese.3 
Implicitly, ethnicity therefore means a group with a distinctive culture 
that demographically, but also — and especially — politically, constitutes 
a minority.
 The notion of ethnicity conveys a set of stereotypes formed in 
contrast to the dominant Lao group. There is a distinction between, 
on the one hand, Buddhist Lao cultivating wet rice agriculture in the 
plains who have been integrated for a long time into states; and the 
“others,” animistic shifting (or “slash and burn”) cultivators, organized 
in tribes and living in the mountains. Putting aside preconceptions, 
these stereotypes are based, as is often the case, on some facts, though 
each criterion must be nuanced. The most structured opposition is 
the one that distinguishes between lowlanders and highlanders. Many 
generalizations about ethnic groups are, in fact, linked with their 
upland location, i.e. living in remote areas (that are often border 
areas) and practicing shifting cultivation. This geographical isolation 
(from the lowlands administrative centers’ point of view) is seen as 
one of the factors structuring “ethnic” life, which supposedly has 
remained unchanged and kept its “traditional” way of life. This Lao 
association of “ethnic” to mountains ( phu dǭi) and forests ( pa), 
lands of “savagery,” that contrasts with the “civilized” political center 
(muang), pervades preconceptions frequently associated with the 
pairing of majority and ethnic groups in the eyes of most tourists 
and many policymakers, such as modern vs. archaic, or its reverse — 
peoples corrupted by modern life vs. populations that have preserved 
their culture and are close to nature.
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 A well-informed public would say that there are officially 49 eth-
nic groups in Laos, divided across three broad categories — (i) Lao Lum 
or “lowland Lao”; (ii) Lao Theung or “Lao residing on the slopes of 
mountains”; and (iii) Lao Sung or “upland Lao” — or into four “ethno-
linguistic groups” — (i) Mon-Khmer (or Austro-Asiatic, mainly the 
former Lao Theung); (ii) Tai-Kadai (former Lao Lum); (iii) Tibeto-
Burmese; and (iv) Hmong-Mien or Meo-Yao (former Lao Sung). One 
may read in the general literature on the topic that the Mon-Khmer 
people, coming from India perhaps 3,000 years ago, are the indige-
nous people of Laos. They are divided into many small groups in the 
south and the center (Katang, Makong, Xuay, Ta Oy, etc.), and are 
mainly represented by the Khmu in the north (in addition to Phong, 
Lamed, etc.). Some of these groups have preserved their cultural parti-
cularities due to their remoteness, and others (in higher numbers) 
are seen as more marginalized groups that have been acculturated, 
following a long period of domination by the Lao. The Tai-Kadai 
(Tai, Phu Thay, Lue, Nhouan, etc.) are the dominant population, 
mostly occupying the plains and valleys bottom, where they live from 
wet rice agriculture. They are said to have come from South China 
around the first millennium, to have created several small kingdoms 
now incorporated into Laos (such as Xieng Khuang, Xieng Kheng, 
Sipsong Chau Tai, etc.) and to be mainly Buddhist (except the Black, 
White and Red Tai). This ethno-linguistic family includes the Lao 
people, who gave their name to the country. The Tibeto-Burman 
(Akha, Lahu, Phunoy, etc.) and the Hmong and Yao recently came 
from China (mostly in the second half of the 19th century) and 
reside on the mountaintops. Easily identified by their costumes, these 
groups (especially the Hmong and Yao) are supposedly characterized 
by their pride and independence, and even their bellicosity. This is 
the type of information one can find in the few books offering a sort 
of cataloguing of ethnic groups in Laos. For each group, information 
is given on their name, their history (which is basically a history 
of origin and their period of arrival in Laos), and a set of selected 
criteria (according to the Soviet ethnographic orthodoxy that Lao 
ethnographers inherited via Vietnamese anthropologists; these mains 
criteria are language, territory, culture, and economy). Main distinc-
tive cultural traits of each group (e.g. baskets for the Mon-Khmer, 
weaving for the Tai, colorful embroidery for the Tibeto-Burman, etc.) 
are also depicted in these books.
Map 10.1   Linguistic families distribution in Laos.
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Main ethnic groups per province (in percentage)
Vientiane capital Lao (92.6) Phou Thay (3.1) Hmong (1.4)
Phongsaly Khmu (24.4) Akha (20.0) Phunoy (19.4)
Luang Namtha Khmu (24.7) Akha (23.9) Lue (15.8)
Oudomxay Khmu (57.7) Hmong (13.1) Lue (12.2)
Bokeo Khmu (23.8) Lue (20.6) Lao (13.4)
Luang Phrabang Khmu (45.9) Lao (28.6) Hmong (15.2)
Huaphan Phou Thay (31.5) Lao (30.0) Hmong (20.3)
Xayaboury Lao (63.4) Khmu  (9.0) Lue (8.1)
Xiengkhuang Lao (44.3) Hmong (34.2) Phou Thay (10.2)
Vientiane Lao (63.8) Phou Thay (14.0) Khmu (12.5)
Borikhamxay Phou Thay (41.0) Lao (40.2) Hmong (9.2)
Khammuane Lao (59.4) Phou Thay (21.7) Makong (13.4)
Savannakhet Lao (57.5) Phou Thay (18.9) Katang (8.7)
Saravane Lao (60.0) Katang (13.3) Xuay (8.1)
Sekong Katu (24.3) Triang (21.8) Harak (15.5)
Champasack Lao (84.8) Lavy (4.9) Xuay (2.4)
Attapeu Lao (36.9) Lavy (17.4) Oy (16.4)
Source: 1995 census
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 This way of naming and classifying groups is the result of a long 
history based on how states have perceived the groups they have in-
corporated. This history therefore has varied depending on the nature 
of these states, and the type of relations these states have maintained 
with their subjects. Let us now briefly examine the main stages of 
this process.
Genealogy of Ethnic Classification
Ancient kingdoms and principalities that once controlled the region 
did not seek to produce written reports on the populations they ruled. 
Ethnonyms may be found here and there in their chronicles. However, 
their use seems imprecise and many of them are no longer in effect 
today. Nonetheless, a structuring dualistic classification has emerged 
from these chronicles, marking a distinction between “Tai” and “Kha.” 
Skin color was used as a marker of difference and hierarchy in this 
classification: a common myth tells that the Kha and Tai emerged 
from a gourd, the former appearing black because they came out from 
a hole made with a firebrand, while the latter were white because their 
hole was made with a punch (Archaimbault 1973). However, the Tai/
Kha is less a racial than a civilizational or ethno-political classification 
(as already noted by Lefevre-Pontalis 1896). The term Tai describes 
people sharing similar languages, culture and, more importantly, a way 
of life (based on wet rice cultivation located in plains and valleys) and 
a political organization based on muang chieftaincy. In relation to the 
Tai, Kha represented the others, who lived from shifting cultivation 
in the mountains and were, or potentially were, subservient to the 
muang chieftaincy power (see below).4 We can see this opposition be-
tween Tai and Kha as the origin of the current Laotian representation 
associated with the majority and the ethnic minorities.
 The French colonial administrators conducted the first ethnogra-
phic investigations in order to identify their new “protected” popula-
tions. They faced many ethnonyms and found it difficult to organize 
them. They took over the generic categories Tai and Kha, and had 
the tendency to “racialize” them. The Kha were sometimes called 
Indonesian and proto-Indo-Chinese, and the French used the terms 
“race of Mongolian origin,” or “Chinese race” or “Chinoisants” to refer 
to people coming from China (Hmong, Yao, Akha, and so on). In 
the end, as long as the colonial rule lasted, the lexicon was imprecise 
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(terms of race, tribe, type, and finally ethnicity — that gradually im-
poses itself — stand and blend differently according to the authors, 
even within the same book), and no precise ethnic classification was 
established. In any case, these classifications had very little effect on 
the populations concerned; except for the distinction between Tai and 
Kha, ethnic belonging had no legal or concrete impact. Still, these 
early attempts to formulate a comprehensive classification based on 
supposedly objective criteria, associated with the emerging racial inter-
pretation of human groups, would have a promising future in Laos 
and elsewhere in the world.
 The desire to simplify these classifications and use them as a 
unifying instrument generated a tripartite classification after the inde-
pendence of Laos in 1953 (there is debate among researchers over 
whether this classification was initiated by the royalists or the commu-
nists). It distinguished between lowland Lao(tian), midland Lao(tian) 
and upland Lao(tian): Lao Lum, Lao Theung, and Lao Sung. This 
classification has been a great success; although officially abolished, 
it is still in effect. It had the advantage of being simple, neutral 
(removing the old pejorative term Kha “slave” — e.g. Kha Kheu and 
Kha Bit became Lao Kheu and Lao Bit), based on a logic of habitat 
and inclusivity (all had the common denominator “Lao” that desig-
nates them as citizens of the same country), while having a certain 
continuity since it encompassed the former division (Tai/Kha + “aliens” 
from China).
 This tripartite classification was however criticized by President 
Kaysone Phomvihane because of its unscientific nature and was re-
placed in the 1980s by linguistic categories and ethnic terms gradually 
established by the Institute of Ethnography of Laos, which was its 
main task.5 The population did not adopt this new “ethno-linguistic 
groups” classification in day-to-day language. In contrast, it is well 
accepted by development agencies and most researchers because of its 
supposedly more scientific basis. Besides having the advantage of over-
lapping with the previous classification, this classification in linguistic 
families provides (like racial classifications, of which it is the descen-
dant) an apparently coherent picture of ethnic groups in Laos based 
on a single criterion.6
 From a political classification based on hierarchy (Tai/Kha) to a 
“scientific” classification based on race or language, through an inclu-
sive classification on a geographical basis (between Lao Lum/Theung/
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Sung), these attempts to understand the diversity of human groups 
in a given area tell us more about how states think about groups that 
live on their territory than the nature of these groups. Moreover, it is 
now accepted by the scientific community that the project to list a set 
of groups on identical criteria, placing all of them on the same level 
and identifying them definitively, is a modern state technology of con-
trol (note that ethnic identification in Laos is mentioned on identity 
cards). For some authors, ethnic identities are themselves creations of 
the state, and first and foremost, of the colonial state (Evans 1999a; 
Keyes 2002; Salemink 2003). Moving away from the state level, let 
us now turn to how people classified as ethnic minorities think and 
express their own ethnic belonging and membership, as well as those 
of their neighbors.
Local Perceptions of Ethnicity
In fact, all individuals encountered during our investigations identified 
themselves with a named group, being or not officially recognized as 
such in the national classification (classification that most people were 
not aware of, which greatly relativizes its impact). We also noticed a 
frequent use of endogenous generic categories comprising a wide range 
of groups, such as those used by state agents or dominant groups. 
Thus, if the Lao do not differentiate the many groups they designate 
by the term “Lao Sung,” similarly, Akha include all Tai groups, 
together with Lao, under the name Bice, while Khmu grouped them 
under the category of Tje. Many people also share a story, explaining 
that each ethnic group was formed by the offspring of a brother and 
sister who survived a flood and/or emerged out of a gourd (Lemoine 
1987a; Proschan 2001). These stories are accompanied by an open 
and contextual list of groups. This logic, which means that each level 
of membership comes from splits occurring at different stages of the 
same genealogy, is also mobilized to explain the existence of sub-
groups, clans, and lineages that make up a group. Finally, it is also 
important to note that, to illustrate their differences, people select a 
few practices for themselves that contrast with the practices of their 
neighbors. Language is the first criterion that is put forward, while for 
two very close groups, it is often the minor details (costumes, rituals, 
etc.) that are mobilized for differentiation purposes. All groups thus 
produce a discourse about themselves in order to stand apart from 
Table 10.1   Ethnic groups in Laos.
     % in total % living
 
Classifications
  Official list of Population national in Laos
1950 < 1950 –1980 < 1980 ethnic groups * (2005) population (estimation) **
   Lao 3 067 005 54,6 n/a 
   Tai 215 254 3,8 16
 Lowland  Phou Thay 187 391 3,3 22
Tai Laotians Lao-Tai Lue 123 054 2,2 16 (Lao Loum)  Nhouan 29 442 0,5 n/a   Thay Neua 14 799 0,3  2
   Yang 6 160 0,1 n/a
   Xaek 3 733 0,1 25
   Khmu 613 893 10,9 86
   Katang 118 276 2,1 99
   Makong 117 842 2,1 63
   Yrou (Laven) 47 175 0,8 100
   Xuay 42 834 0,8 9
   Ta Oy 32 177 0,6 63
   Triang (Talieng) 29 134 0,5 100
   Tri 26 680 0,5 32
   Phong 26 314 0,5 100
   Brao (Lavae) 22 772 0,4 71
   Katu 22 759 0,4 31
   Oy 22 458 0,4 100
   Pray (Thin) 21 922 0,4 49
   Harak (Alack) 21 280 0,4 100
 Midland  Lamed 19 827 0,4 99
Kha Laotians Môn-Khmer Pakoh 16 750 0,3 50 (Lao Theung)  Kriang (Ngae) 12 879 0,2 100   Yae 10 570 0,2 38
   Xing Moun 8 565 0,2 32
   Cheng 7 559 0,1 100
   Gnaheun 6 785 0,1 100
   Khmer 5 829 0,1 0
   Toum 4 458 0,1 100
   Samtao 3 533 0,1 27
   Bid 1 964 0,0 80
   Lavy 1 193 0,0 n/a
   Sadang 938 0,0 6
   Ngouane 722 0,0 n/a
   Oedou 649 0,0 100
   Moy 534 0,0 n/a
   Thaen 514 0,0 n/a
   Kri 495 0,0 65
  Hmong-Iu Mien Hmong 451 946 8,0 22    Iumien (Yao) 27 449 0,5 3
   Akha (Kor, Khir) 90 698 1,6 16
 Upland  Phunoy (Singsili) 37 447 0,7 100
 Laotians  Lahu (Musir) 15 238 0,3 3
 (Lao soung) Sino-tibetan Hor 10 437 0,2 n/a
   Sila 2 939 0,1 81
   Lolo 1 691 0,0 0
   Ha Nyi (Hayi) 848 0,0 0
* Ethnic names and their spelling are the ones used by the State and the 2005 census (names in brackets are 
those used in the 1995 census).
** Estimations based on censuses from neighboring countries (China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia) 
and on data compiled from the website http://ethnologue.com. Since these censuses were carried out in dif-
ferent years and since ethnic classifications vary from one country to another, these data are purely indicative.
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other groups (and not necessarily from the state). It thus appears that 
naming, classifying, and thinking of groups as natural entities based 
on objectively measurable criteria (including linguistic and cultural 
criteria), is not specific to state officials or scholars. To see a group, 
your own group, as a species, naturalizes and subsequently reinforces 
feelings of belonging.
 Locally, criteria forming the group are apparently simple: a group 
is an ensemble of individuals sharing the same language and the same 
traditions, living and marrying each other, and between whom a 
certain degree of solidarity is expected. These criteria are articulated 
amongst themselves. The feeling of forming a community under a 
common origin (real or perceived) is based on the cultural heritage 
of ancestors, and creates a sphere of understanding and interactions 
based on sharing the same language and the same customs that justi-
fies exogamy (marriage does not occur between close relatives) and 
group endogamy.7 What then complicates the establishment of a list 
of clearly bounded and culturally distinct groups in the country?
 The most obvious answer is that there are different levels of in-
clusion. Groups tend to perceive themselves according to a segmental 
logic, and an individual can identify himself with different levels 
of segmentation. Just as I can choose to identify myself as Parisian, 
French, or European, it is the same for a given individual who can call 
himself Pusho, Akha, and Hani, or Tai Bam, Tai Dam, and Phutai. 
Identification that is selected as relevant may vary depending on who 
is being addressed (Proschan 1996). A Pusho would describe himself 
as such in interaction with another Akha, and as Akha in contrast to 
another Hani; but with a Khmu, for example, he will present himself 
as Lao Ko (the term used by the Lao to designate all the Akha and 
Hani). Some exogenous names — based on toponymy (Kheu), former 
status (Prai), linguistic features (Tai Kaleu), etc. — given to a group or 
a set of heterogeneous populations can be adopted by these peoples, 
and contribute progressively toward making the latter consider that 
they constitute a real group (Bouté 2010).
 However, it is not merely a matter of nomenclature and a level 
of inclusion. We have mentioned that group identification is justified 
by a common origin and is characterized by the same habitus. This 
membership becomes less clear when these two criteria, which usually 
go together, are disconnected. Many situations show this, such as 
interethnic adoptions. An adopted child belongs to his adopting 
260 Grégoire Schlemmer
parents’ group, but can keep in touch with his biological parents and 
have a sentimental attachment to his birth group. During periods of 
unrest and migration, such phenomena may also concern adoption of 
entire families of other groups seeking asylum in a community (and 
they can give rise to new clans). This illustrates that descent, which 
creates a sense of community, is not necessarily genealogically true. 
In fact, a group can be formed in various circumstances: disparate 
group of migrants, assigned identity by more powerful groups, inclu-
sion under a single authority, or through territorial sharing, and so 
on. One can also mention the case of interethnic marriages, however 
infrequent. In this case, ethnicity is transmitted through the father, 
but it is actually where they will live (in the village of the bride or 
with the groom’s parents) that takes precedence. In many groups, a 
family without boys has the possibility of marrying a daughter to a 
man of any ethnic group. In exchange for the legacy of her in-law, 
this man will be considered the legitimate son of the bride’s family. 
He will honor the spirits of his in-laws, and sometimes will even 
adopt the clan of his stepfather, even changing his own ethnicity if 
the stepfather comes from another group.
 Other practices create relationships expressed in terms of kinship 
at a supra-ethnic level, e.g. the widespread tradition of the adoptive 
father (the first foreigner going inside a home during the week fol-
lowing a birth will become the adoptive parent of the new-born) or 
fidéjurées friendships (two people of the same age deciding to declare 
themselves siblings and acting accordingly). Note also the surprising 
idea that clan membership can cross ethnic boundaries. Locally, clans 
(named groups of related people claiming to be descendants of a 
common ancestor) are defined by a name and/or a ban, and many 
argue that anyone having that name or respecting the same ban are 
relatives, regardless of their ethnicity.
 Finally, let us recall one obvious fact: everything that defines the 
life of a group does not necessarily refer to ethnicity or intersect with 
ethnic divisions. This is true up to the level of what is supposed to 
form the basis of each group’s specificity: its traditions. No rite is ever 
carried out at the level of the entire ethnic group, and rituals beyond 
the village level are rare, even among small groups. Traditional healers 
can be summoned by patients that do not belong to the same ethnic 
group. A number of rituals are borrowed from elsewhere, and claimed 
as such. Many other rituals are performed on a territorial basis (be it 
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a field, a village, or a region) and thus transcend ethnic boundaries. 
All this makes it possible to identify a common ritual logic to a vast 
and diverse set of people.8 Finally, relationships drawing on ethnicity 
are rarely mobilized and have little practical effect: ethnicity defines 
a set of relations of possible communications, unions, and solidarity 
(sometimes more expected than real). But in practice, the vast majority 
of interactions and exchanges that makes up the daily life of groups 
occurs at the village or county level.
 To sum up, if ethnicity can be precisely defined at a theoretical 
level, the reality is much more complex. The different levels of pos-
sible inclusions, intermingling between groups (group compositions 
which change over time by fusion, distinction, dissolution, etc.) and 
the existence of supra-ethnic realities greatly complicate the situation. 
The views that we call “primordialist” — i.e. ethnicity is a stable clas-
sifiable unit that can be clearly defined by distinctive criteria — are 
shared both by members of these groups and by the state. But this 
does not make it a reality. No list of criteria will ever be sufficient to 
clearly define an ethnic group, for ultimately what makes a group is 
the fact of naming it. It is a feeling of belonging, shared by a number 
of people who claim that they form a group. This therefore leads one 
Plate 10.1 Costumes are not always 
an ethnic marker. Indeed, only the 
belt worn by this woman enables us to 
recognize her as Lolo. Lolo clothes are 
similar to the Ho/Chinese population’s 
(and vary according to localization 
as much as ethnic belonging), and 
come from Yunnan, where they were 
fashionable in the 19th century.
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to question the phenomena and circumstances that guide a group of 
individuals to share the same membership. Why do some not recog-
nize any membership superior to the village entity, while elsewhere, 
millions of people see themselves as sharing a common belonging? 
On what basis do individuals group themselves and form a common 
social space? What creates the sense of belonging? These questions 
steer us on a political level (in the large sense of the term) and lead 
us to provide a historical approach to the formation and evolution of 
these entities called “ethnic groups.”
Historical Formation of Ethnic Belonging and 
Interaction with the States
It would be impossible to reconstitute the history of the formation 
of each group. Nonetheless, we can present some structural patterns 
of integrative and differential factors that participated in forming, 
structuring, and changing ethnicities and interethnic relations. Un-
covering these long-term trends, as well as sudden changes, allows us 
to paint in broad strokes the regional history of this land that would 
become Laos.
Precolonial Times: Tai, Kha, and Muang
We begin with what we know or can assume about the constitution 
and the relationship between Tai and Kha categories of people, by 
illustrating that they cannot be solely explained by referring to lin-
guistic groups.
Tai and Kha
The presence of Austro-Asiatic speaking populations in Laos seems 
dates back to thousands of years. Especially under the influence of 
Indian culture, some of these peoples have developed a state organiza-
tion. Southern Laos was incorporated into the proto-Khmer kingdom 
of Chenla; the Tai royal chronicles mention a “Kha King” who was 
present upon their arrival in Luang Phrabang and Chiang Mai, while 
northern Laos was possibly under the influence of the kingdom 
of Nan Chao, controlled by populations speaking Tibeto-Burmese 
languages (Coedes 1964; Archaimbault 1973; Tanabe 2000). We can 
assume that there was an early contrast between plains populations 
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integrated into kingdoms and those of the mountains, regardless of 
their linguistic family (as is the case in Cambodia, where Khmer of 
the plains and Phnong of the mountains speak related languages).
 The end of the first millennium (around 7th–10th) sees the 
arrival of the Tai-speaking populations. Their lifestyle was based on 
flooded rice cultivation and organized into principalities (muang). 
While influenced by those civilizations that were already present, they 
would gradually dominate the entire region. A religious unity appeared 
with the development of Buddhism and the tham writing system 
among western Tai (Keyes 1995; Grabowsky 2011b), and Tai groups 
progressively launched the path to the new dominant civilization. 
We can assume that the populations previously inhabiting the plains 
were progressively assimilated to the Tai, others taking refuge in the 
mountains, a process that contributed toward the formation of the 
Tai/Kha distinction, which must be seen as socionyms based on eco-
nomical and political facts rather than on an ethnic or racial reality.
Wet Rice and Shifting Cultivation
While it is possible to moderate the contrast between plains and 
mountains that he draws,9 the fact remains that James C. Scott (2009) 
clearly shows the possible correlations between political organization 
and agricultural techniques. Flooded rice fields allow high productivity 
and therefore the potential release of surplus, but their constrained 
locations (flat and irrigable land) cause fixity of settlements, which 
exposes them to raids and requires water supply organization at the 
supra-village level. All these factors favor some form of centralization 
and control. While limiting the production of surplus, shifting culti-
vation allows more autonomy. The low level of required labor skills 
favors production at the household or lineage level. It requires, at most, 
internal village cohesion in order to ensure field monitoring and the 
execution of time-consuming work (planting, weeding, harvesting), 
and to decide the agrarian land management. It therefore suits rela-
tively autonomous communities, which may explain why the village 
unit is often the most important one among the shifting cultivators.
 As both types of farmers produced most of their subsistence 
food products, local trade was relatively undeveloped. Until recently, 
lowland and upland villages only exchanged a few products (such 
as river products against forest products or Tai fabric against upland 
basketry). The professional traders exchanged fabric, iron, salt, and 
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a few manufactured goods against forest products (which formed 
the basis of long tribute), surplus crops, cotton, and later cash crops 
such as opium. Traders were mostly Lao, who organized outlets on 
the riverbanks they navigated with their pirogues, but could also be 
from other groups, such as the Yuan in the west, or the Ho and their 
caravans of horses traveling along ridge lines in the north. These trade 
routes gave the mountainous villages chosen as caravan stops some 
importance. These commercial exchanges created partial interdepen-
dence between Tai and Kha populations and made both of them 
actors in international trade networks. In addition, the role each group 
played in this trade intensified their distinctiveness (Goudineau 2008; 
Salemink 2008).
Muang and Commerce
These commercial transactions were accompanied by political relations 
with numerous Tai lords (from the king of Lan Xang to the small 
local lord), whose wealth was based on a multi-tiered system of taxa-
tion (from the village to the local lord, who gave a part to a superior 
lord and so on), the use of forced labor, the control of strategic 
locations (intersections of communication roads, saline mines), and 
capture of labor (through wars and slavery — in order to increase a 
kingdom’s manpower and subjects, which could lead to significant 
population displacement). In this organization, Tai and Kha held dif-
ferent roles (Lemoine 1987b). Tai subjects participated in public life 
and owned rice land, but paid taxes and had to participate in wars. 
The Kha did not participate in the political life of the muang, even 
though they were integrated in them to varying degrees. These degrees 
ranged from de facto autonomy (more common in the south, where 
the mountainous areas remained out of direct control of Tai king-
doms for a long time) to subservience, leading to a high degree of 
acculturation, inducing a form of “taization” (more common in the 
north, where Tai kingdoms were numerous). Other Kha populations 
could also play an intermediary role in business networks and/or 
policies between Tai and other more distant or belligerent Kha. The 
indirect rule of the muang applies differentiated taxes according to 
status, which fits well with cultural differences. The muang therefore 
is more or less inclusive, but not an assimilating model. This political 
organization has maintained the differences that justify or concretize 
the ethno-political division that structured the Tai social space. Thus, 
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forms of integration, depending on the type of economy and degree 
of network integration, political domination, cultural influence of 
the dominant population, and spatial inscription (villages’ fixity or 
mobility, anteriority on the land), have all contributed to shape the 
different ethnic groups in Laos.10
Integration into Empires and the Emergence of Modern States
Throughout the 19th century, English and French colonial empires and 
the Siamese kingdom established themselves in the area. Combined 
with the disintegration of Manchu China following the Opium Wars 
and the many internal revolts that happened there, these events dis-
rupted the population of Laos and led to major political changes. 
The most important of these was the progressive establishment of a 
political entity based on the model of the nation-state.
The Upheavals of the 19th Century
The Lan Xang kingdom, established in 1354, is perceived as the pre-
cursor of present-day Laos. It was the most important kingdom in 
the area for a period and it founded the Lao identity. After it broke 
up in 1707, the three kingdoms that resulted from its dislocation 
(Luang Phrabang, Vientiane, and Champasak) suffered numerous 
attacks, leading to a long period of unrest and political disintegration. 
The Burmese first perpetrated these attacks; then throughout the 
19th century, the Siamese gradually extended their influence on the 
country. A history of the Siamese impact on Laos remains to be writ-
ten, but we know that they appointed local leaders and organized the 
territories in a more uniform and administrative way; these measures 
foreshadowing the changes made by the French colonization. They 
also organized a massive deportation of Tai people (Phuan, Phutai, 
Lao) to the current northeast of Thailand, where they now form the 
majority of the population (Smuckarn and Breazeale 1988).
 Meanwhile, various revolts (Taiping, Nien, Panthay, Dungan, 
Miao, etc.) that bloodied Southern China between 1850 and 1870 
and resulted in massacres of tens of millions of people caused a large 
migration to the south, including Laos (Culas and Michaud 2004). 
At the same time, northern Laos was the setting of a major “Kha 
revolt” and of the devastating raids carried out by irregular armed 
troops from China (the “yellow,” “black,” and “red flags”), which led 
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to significant population movements within the country. Many small 
groups operating in northern Laos were formed during this migration 
period. This partially explains their small size (sometimes one original 
village and those who split from it). In contrast to Tai and Kha inha-
bitants, these immigrants (Hmong, Yao, Akha, etc.) stood out because 
of their common cultural references to the Chinese world (a strong 
patrilineal clan system, consumption of non-glutinous rice, houses 
built on soil, and so on). This, sometimes coupled with a strong sense 
of independence fostered by their flight, made their subservience 
harder to achieve. The depopulation of Tai people operated by the 
Siamese, in parallel with the influx of people from the north, changed 
the balance and the relationship between Tai and non-Tai people, and 
altered the entire ethnic composition of Laos.
The French Colonization11
After taking control of Vietnam, the French gradually expanded their 
influence on Laos to ensure the safety of their colony, to halt the 
Siamese advance, and in the illusory hope that the Mekong would 
serve as a gateway to the Chinese market. In 1893, Laos became a 
French protectorate. The French rapidly lost interest in this expensive 
territory that never fulfilled its economic potential. Their intervention 
was limited, especially in the ancient kingdom of Luang Phrabang; 
here they operated, with few men and little means, an indirect control 
over the court.
 The overall impact of the colonial period was primarily the 
establishment of the state in the modern sense. French colonial power 
aimed to pacify and control the territory by border monitoring, a pre-
cise contouring of borders and a single politico-administrative net-
work reducing the power of local leaders. They also attempted (albeit 
to limited effect) to generalize market economy (via fighting against 
the clearing and exploitation of forests, and development of com-
mercial agriculture), and to establish basic schools and public health 
services. The juridical and political transformations implemented 
by the colonial power contributed to the gradual transformation of 
subjects, once under the rule of a multitude of lords, to citizens of a 
state in making.
 Relations between the French government and ethnic minorities 
varied depending on contexts. In the north, the colonial administra-
tion sought to win their sympathy to counter the hostility generated 
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by the loss of power of the former dominant populations (Lao, Tai 
Lue). Hence, in particular, the abolition of slavery and attempts to 
break the bonds of vassalage of the Kha, in the name of freedom and 
in the hope that this would benefit the colony. The colonial adminis-
tration also promoted the appointment of leaders from local groups 
regardless of their ethnicity (while maintaining — or expanding — the 
system of taxes and corvées for both Lao and non Lao people), which 
resulted in the emergence of an embryonic ethnic elite. To the south, 
the situation was tenser: the colonial administration had to fight 
against the “unruly people” and/or against the “losers” of the aboli-
tion of slavery (this abolition had led to a significant shortfall in the 
whole region, and this contributed to motivating significant rebellions 
for decades (Moppert 1981; Gunn 1983). We should also mention 
the great and new interest in border areas. The colonial administra-
tion focused on these formerly neglected margins, first by necessity —
 to pacify the forefront of a growing empire (Walker 2008) — and 
subsequently in order to develop cross-border trade and opium culti-
vation, on which it attempted to create a monopoly (which never 
really worked). This transformed border areas into places of smuggling, 
and the attempts to stop it permanently burdened the colonial 
administration.
 The colonial power possibly had more impact on Lao ethnicity 
than on that of the ethnic minorities. During this period, the flexible 
term of “Lao” (used to refer a wide range of people in the northern 
and eastern peripheries of the Siamese world) was gradually used to 
specifically name a people bound to a nation: Laos (Briggs 1949; 
Evans 1999a). Furthermore, the French colonialists’ will to pull Laos 
away from Thailand, coupled with the rise of a strong pan-Tai move-
ment (which led Siam to rename itself Thailand in 1939) pushed the 
Lao of Laos to develop, with the support of French colonial authori-
ties, a cultural nationalism. It played a part in naturalizing the idea 
of a nation and Lao people, as well as forging a national spirit 
(Ivarsson 2008). Such nationalism caught on, especially within the 
small nascent class of civil servants, the small Lao aristocracy (Goscha 
and Ivarsson 2007), and an urban elite that developed gradually 
during the colonial period and became agents of political nationalism 
following the takeover of the country by the Japanese and its inde-
pendence in 1945.
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Beginning of the Communist Regime to the Present
From the wars for independence (1945–75) to the present day, ethnic 
minorities in Laos faced some dramatic changes that substantially 
affected their livelihood. The first was the civil war and the division 
of the population into two camps (the communist camp and the 
royal camp), which transcended ethnic divisions. People from different 
ethnic origins sometimes fought together (intentionally or not) and 
faced enemies belonging to the same ethnic group — the Hmong case 
being the most famous one (Lee 1982). During this period, the peri-
pheral highlands became the main scene for the conflicts and new 
strategic sites. Members of the Lao Issara (the communist liberation 
movement), who first took refuge in the mountainous areas during 
the first decade of the “Liberation war,” largely succeeded in imple-
menting their strategies among the minorities as they included the 
latter in the new model of society they were fighting for (Rathie, 
this volume).
 After the war, there followed a period of socialist construction 
(from 1960 or 1975, depending on the area, to 1986) by the new 
regime of the Lao PDR. This was a time of rapid and strong imple-
mentation of the new regime’s policy. Concerning minorities, it was 
accompanied by a desire to control what was, for the Communists, 
an advantage during the war, but potentially a threat for them after 
the war: autonomy and mobility of ethnic minorities, and the borders 
permeability. There was and still is a strong fear of potential ethnic 
antagonism among the national authorities. This fear was partly the 
result of the political strategies of ethnic dissension driven by the 
French, the Americans, the Thai, and the Chinese during the war 
(Gunn 1983). Since then, one of the government’s key priorities has 
been the security (especially on the borders) and integrity of the terri-
tory, as well as the control of any possibility of dissension in the 
country. Since the launch of the New Economic Mechanism (1986), 
the country has been experiencing a relative decrease in political 
control. But at the same time, important economic transformations 
related to the opening of a market economy have created conditions 
that provide further integration of the highlands and their inhabitants.
 The Lao Government’s perceptions of the ethnic minorities varied 
during these different periods (i.e. wartime, socialist reforms, and 
economic liberalization). But it remains based on a dual objective 
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which appears contradictory: on the one hand, the recognition and 
fulfillment at the national level of ethnic and cultural diversity; and on 
the other hand, the search for national unity which involves a much 
stronger integration policy. In other words, the government’s objective 
was not only to promote the Lao cultural pluri-ethnic diversity, but 
to exceed it to reach the ideal of the “Lao socialist people” — which 
would progressively shift to the model of “development” ( patthana) — 
conceived as a way to overcome ethnic differences. This approach was 
then based on increased government involvement in ethnic issues and 
paved the way for integration and even assimilation. This dual objec-
tive is expressed both in the 1981 and 1982 Resolutions, two main 
texts regarding ethnic issues, and in the 1991 Constitution’s almost 
contradictory formulation, “the Lao multi-ethnic people” ( pasason lao 
banda phao). The first of the Constitution’s nine uses of the term 
“ethnic group” — “a sovereign and indivisible multi-ethnic state” — can 
suggest a link between ethnicity and the possible threat of social dis-
sension. Indeed, ethnicity appears here as an inferior, but also com-
petitive, form of belonging than the national community, and even 
as a possible competing membership. However, in this Constitution, 
ethnicity is also linked with some positive elements the nation should 
preserve and promote — such as material and immaterial heritage — 
and with development patterns to improve livelihood, education, and 
economy, among other things. We now take a closer look at all of 
these elements.
Culture and Religion
The tension between recognition and integration/assimilation is re-
flected in the cultural and religious policies carried out by the Lao 
government. It acknowledges and emphasizes features of national di-
versity, including: the recognition of the ethnonyms (discussed above); 
radio and television programs in Khmu and Hmong languages and 
an attempt to find a text transcription of them; a strong visual repre-
sentation of the country’s ethnic diversity in the media, mainly during 
official parades. All these elements are appreciated by members of 
the ethnic minorities and understood as the state’s recognition of 
their identity. But these elements generally remain aesthetic and 
“folklorized”: they are dances, costumes, songs, handicraft, etc., and 
as such they appear largely non-political and as an expression of what 
a “correct” culture should be. Indeed, the government has always 
Plate  10.2a–b The two sides of the Boun Tai district signboard (Phong-
saly province) show two representations of Lao citizens. One side expresses 
ethnicity by displaying the ethnic diversity of the district through images 
of women wearing “representative” dresses and united around the woman 
of the dominant ethnic group (usually the Lao, but since there are no Lao 
in this district, a Tai Lu woman is instead being depicted). The other side 
embodies social class, represented by various professions united for the 
development of the country.
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fought against what it has considered to be “bad” cultural practices 
and beliefs (such as ritual sacrifices of buffaloes, local therapists, or 
extravagant expenditures for funerals or weddings). This kind of cul-
tural repression was strong during the 1960s and extended to the Lao 
ethnic group itself. After that, these actions began to be more isolated 
or targeted, but they still continued until the end of the 1990s.
 The economic opening of the country has seen an easing of these 
policies. There is still a willingness expressed in the official speeches 
for an eradication of the “bad” ethnic habits, but it is less coercive in 
practice (with the exception of Christianity, and especially Evangelical 
churches, which are still very unwelcome by the government). There 
is even an emerging promotion of some ethnic practices as a way 
to improve cultural tourism. An ethnic Akha explained to me, for 
instance: “Before, the authorities used to tell us not to wear our tradi-
tional clothes, but we didn’t agree. Now, they ask us to wear them 
again, but we don’t want to anymore!” Indeed, the pressure applied 
for more than two decades, coupled with transformations of social 
relations, have had significant direct or indirect (internal reforms, 
gradual acculturation) effects on these populations.
 On the other hand, this liberalization of cultural practices has 
been accompanied by the state’s clear desire to seek a new ethno-
nationalistic legitimacy. This legitimacy is based on the recognition and 
investment in two major symbols of the dominant group: its royal 
past and Buddhism. These nationalist policies have re-appropriated 
sources of authority that were potentially competing with the political 
authority, and have given some legitimacy back to a regime that has 
abandoned its socialist policies and must face the gradual disappear-
ance of memories of liberation and the struggle for independence.12 
Yet, Buddhism, which the state promotes as a marker of national 
identity, officially concerns only 67 percent of the population in Laos 
(even if it does not compete with any other religion, the sacrificial 
practices and local cults — known as “animism” in Western literature — 
are not recognized as “religion” in Laos).13
Politics and Education
The fear of ethnic dissension, coupled with the idea that the socialist 
man had to transcend all affiliations, pushed the state to an inclusive 
policy that did not differentiate any ethnic group, positively or nega-
tively. The government has never supported ethnic autonomous areas 
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(even if this has never been an important claim, perhaps because such 
a request would have been almost unfeasible due to the absence of 
areas of contiguous homogeneous ethnic population). It is also in the 
name of ethnic equality that the government refuses the use of con-
cepts such as “indigenous people” and even tends to deny any histori-
cal anteriority to any ethnic groups.14 Such a notion of indigeneity 
could indeed be synonymous with land and political claims, possibly 
backed by international support. There is also no official quota policy, 
even if a representation of ethnic diversity sometimes seems to be 
favored (in provinces where ethnic minorities account for a significant 
share of the population, there is sometimes an unofficial alternation 
of leaders from different ethnic groups).
 Yet minority populations sometimes see politics from an ethnic 
angle. Each community is proud of the number of its members 
holding positions in the district, provincial or central government. 
A story circulating among multiple groups explains their lack of poli-
tical representation following a curse. For them, the state is perceived 
as being essentially in the hands of the ethnic Lao. Still, if this low 
political representation may cause regret, even a little bitterness, it 
hardly leads to the rejection of national belonging. Except for a very 
tiny minority group of Hmong, there is no separatist movement, nor 
even any palpable ethnic tension.
 Integrative policy promoted by the communist regime largely 
operated through schooling. Since the war, communists quickly fo-
cused on school construction — gradually implemented in all villages — 
as well as colleges and high schools in the districts. While being an 
end in itself, the development of mass education was motivated by 
multiple goals and had consequences in different fields. The school 
was an important factor in ethnic mix, simply because the teacher 
was often from a different ethnic group from the village where he 
taught. A respected figure in the villages, he represented the outside 
world and a model of social ascension. The school has fostered inter-
ethnic unions via the teachers themselves (often young, many teachers 
get married where they teach) and the secondary school students 
(high schools only exist in the districts where students from remote 
villages have to stay in the dormitory, which further promotes ethnic 
diversity). Schooling also promoted the spread of the Lao language, 
which has become the vehicular language almost everywhere. Although 
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not prohibited, the government did not promote education in minority 
languages.
 Even if the education provided was — and continues to be — of 
poor quality, school habitus (discipline, schedules, uniforms, interac-
tions, submission to state authority) is enough to instill the idea of a 
new authority and legitimacy, different from the elders and tradition. 
By promoting collective investment, self-criticism, and the values of 
solidarity and sacrifice for the nation, the school has become a place 
where a feeling of the new respect for the authority of the party de-
veloped (Halpern and Clark 1966; Langer 1971). Above all, the school 
developed an important body of officials (six percent of the active 
population in 2005), and the small political elite who originated from 
it. In the early days of revolutionary schooling, a basic knowledge 
such as mastery of reading and writing helped to train all personnel 
(soldiers, nurses, local executives, etc.) necessary for the implementa-
tion of the new system, and allowed it to evolve in the emerging 
bureaucracy. Initially these posts were unpopular because they were 
poorly paid, but gradually these administrative positions were in 
demand. Public service is now the most accessible alternative to the 
peasantry. It is also through school (where the Party recruitment 
began, via the youth section of the Party), and by climbing the 
ladder of the administration, that one obtains positions with political 
responsibility. Although limited, the possibility of access to positions 
of power by members of any ethnic group is an important area of 
progress made by the communist regime. It was previously reserved 
for a small elite composed exclusively of members of the Lao group.
Economy and Land Occupation
Among the recent transformations affecting ethnic minorities in the 
country, those in the economic field may be the most important ones. 
In singular continuity with that of the colonial and royal regimes, 
the communist regime’s goal is to achieve greater integration of the 
mountainous areas to the economy of production (first in a socialist 
and then in a market economy framework).
 The central point of this model is the eradication of shifting 
(“slash and burn”) cultivation and relocation of villagers to plains, 
valley bottoms, or roadsides. By removing this agrarian technique 
based on self-production and consumption that allows dispersal and 
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mobility of villages, exploitation of forest resources, sometimes smug-
gling (including cross-border forays) and prohibited crops such as 
opium, the objectives are multiple: preservation of forest areas from 
clearing, fixing populations, development of rice and cash crops, 
securing border areas emptied of their population, and infrastructure 
development (schools, dispensaries, markets, roads) — which include 
the ability to raise taxes, as well as greater control over the country’s 
natural resources (timber, minerals, agricultural land). There is thus 
a convergence of developmental, security, environmental, social, and 
political objectives, one or the other being more or less highlighted as 
the government promotes its policy among the population, businesses, 
international donors, or NGOs.
 It is difficult to say to what extent these policies are motivated by 
a strong integration of minorities. Nonetheless, they disproportionately 
Plate 10.3 Schooling in Lao language (here, of Hmong pupils), aimed at 
national integration, instructing respect for state rule, and favoring inter-
ethnic interactions, as well as the opening up of possibilities to integrate state 
administration.
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affect ethnic minorities (Ireson 1991; Pholsena 2005). They also seem 
to suggest a lack of interest in culture, as if “development” policies 
do not have to care about the respect of group identities. Indeed, 
cultural specificities are rarely taken into account in the development 
plans, both by the state and by NGOs, despite their claims to the 
contrary (Ovesen 2002). And consciously or not, government policy 
favors Lao and Tai fixed villages located in the plains: almost all the 
political centers of the provinces and districts of the country that 
attract infrastructure are located in these villages.
 In any case, the changes induced by these policies have important 
implications for highlanders, and as such for a large proportion of 
ethnic minorities. In contrast to neighboring countries (especially 
Vietnam and China), which promote massive immigration of the 
dominant ethnic group to mountain areas, in Laos, it is the high-
landers who have to go down to the plains. These massive relocations 
disrupt settlement and uproot populations, leading to an important 
phenomenon of acculturation (Goudineau 2000). The transition from 
subsistence farming to cash crop cultivation goes along with land 
dispossession. Indeed, farmers sometimes lack the capital to invest 
in such crops. Some become sharecroppers or wage laborers for large 
Chinese and Vietnamese farms, while many migrate to the plains, 
and settle in multi-ethnic villages and cities. These phenomena have a 
strong effect on the social cohesion of the community: the break-up 
of the group and the collapse of village cohesion, the development of 
internal inequalities, and so on.15
 These phenomena of displacement and land dispossession, com-
bined with the development of a class of officials, have led to the 
expansion of administrative villages in the districts, with small traders 
and marketplaces (made possible by the appearance of employees not 
subsisting on their own production). In these areas, the inhabitants 
are experiencing a new way of living together that emerges as the 
model for the future. In these ethnically mixed villages, the inhabi-
tants are no longer bonded by a village common ritual cycle. Instead, 
sociability is organized into networks of colleagues and neighbors who 
do not necessarily belong to the same group. In this new sociability, 
offering feasts in order to gain prestige (e.g. banquets, payment of 
compensations, marriages, etc.) is becoming increasingly important. 
There is then a change from village/ethnic solidarity to class solidarity 
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that transcends ethnic lines. There is insufficient data on the feeling 
and expression of ethnicity in urban areas (30 percent of the national 
population lives in cities), which nevertheless forms an increasing 
reality. But we find that there are few groups that maintain their 
particularities in urban areas, except for a few exceptions such as the 
Ho (because of their connection to Chinese culture) or the Hmong. 
Being a people with a strong spirit of independence, Hmong people 
earn some respect with their fierce reputation. Coupled with their 
connection to the Hmong diaspora that bring both money and 
self-esteem, this respect allows them to more readily assert their dif-
ferences. Note also that globally, children of mixed couples living in 
cities, which are growing in number, tend to be discreet about their 
ethnic origins, and often present themselves as ethnic Lao.
✻ ✻ ✻
Viewing ethnicity not as an obvious given, but as a product resulting 
from a complex process, allows us to nuance excessively reified and 
fixed representations of ethnic groups. It also warns us against the 
desire to preserve at all costs cultural characteristics of ethnic groups 
in the name of aesthetic love of cultural diversity. Having considera-
tion for these populations implies respect for their aspirations of 
preserving a legacy, as well as for their commitment to change. Like 
any multi-ethnic state, the policy of the Lao state oscillates between 
the following: integration, operated on the model of the dominant 
population which therefore tends to lead to assimilation; and auto-
nomy, which often means excluding these groups with only limited 
access to state services and economic development. It has to deal with 
the difficulty of reconciling the inclusion of ethnic particularities and 
promotion of disadvantaged groups as mentioned in the constitution, 
versus the desire to forge a sense of national identity and to give 
priority to state interests and internal security. For a time, commu-
nism offered an alternative model by proposing a new and inclusive 
society. This model could not be reduced to a simple Lao-cization 
since the Lao themselves had to comply with it. It allowed a better 
presence of ethnic minorities in its representation of the nation, as 
well as better access to education and to political offices, although in 
reality minorities are statistically much poorer and much less integrated 
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than the Lao majority. This top-down model of civic nationalism 
(addressing all citizens regardless of their ethnicity) has gradually 
evolved into a more flexible model, though based on ethnic nation-
alism focusing above all on the sole Lao culture (Evans 2003b). At 
the same time, minority groups are gradually opening up to the mem-
bers of their communities living in other countries — notably, through 
the circulation of cultural goods (CDs and DVDs from China, 
Vietnam, and Thailand) and by visiting relatives that have emigrated 
to Western countries (the United States, France, Australia, etc.). Time 
will tell how the country will evolve following this new path.
Plate 10.4 This picture, whose style is very common in northern Laos, is a 
cutout image of an Akha Pusho couple; in the background is a picture selected 
from a large choice of images depicting how “modernity” is appreciated.
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Notes
1. According to the 2015 census, the Lao represented 53.2 percent of the 
country’s population. Other numerically significant groups include: the 
Khmu (11 percent), Hmong (9.2 percent), Tai (3.1 percent), Phou Thay 
(3.4 percent), Lu (2 percent), Katang (2.2 percent), Makong (2.5 percent), 
and Akha (1.8 percent). The remaining 11.6 percent is divided among 
41 other officially registered groups. Many of these groups are numeri-
 cally larger outside the borders of the country (among the nine groups 
listed, only the Katang, the Makong and the Khmu are mainly found 
in Laos). Note also that a group that forms a minority group in one 
country may be a majority elsewhere. The Ho, a small ethnic group in 
Laos, refer to themselves as Han, the largest population on earth. The 
Lolo (2,203 in Laos according to the 2005 census) form one of the 
largest nationalities of China (more than 8.7 million, according to the 
 2010 Chinese census).
2. Since 2009, I have been researching on issues of ethnicity, and conducting 
field surveys for over four years in Phongsaly province. Part of the data 
presented and the views expressed in this chapter are the result of this 
research. Phongsaly is distinguished by the fact that ethnic diversity is the 
largest in the country, and the number of representatives of the ethnic 
Lao is one of the lowest. That makes this province not fully representative 
of Laos. Nevertheless, it remains illustrative of the situation of northern 
Laos, and reveals some recurring trends at the national level. But I still 
 have to apologize for the “Nordic” prism of this chapter.
3. That is why I will not talk about Vietnamese and Chinese origin commu-
 nities. Their members are not categorized in terms of ethnicity (sonphao) 
but nationality (sonsat), if they have kept their original nationality; or 
they are classified as “other” if they took up Lao citizenship. Many came 
in the 20th century as civil servants (Vietnamese) and businessmen 
(Chinese). These communities are characterized by their urban lifestyles 
 and often higher economic level.
4. On the concept of Tai, see: Briggs (1949) and Pain (2008); on the notion 
of Kha, see: Chamberlain (1992) and Proschan (1996); concerning the 
relations between Tai and Kha, see Turton (2000).
5. The Institute of Ethnography was founded in 1988, following the 
Committee of Nationalities, created in 1976. Due to a lack of resources, 
training, and field survey activities, but also to the influence of Marxist 
orthodoxy and the obsession with classification, a Laotian ethnographic 
tradition never really emerged (there is also virtually no literature but 
a few catalogs of ethnic groups). The main job of the Institute of 
Ethnography was to operate and adjust a classification of ethnic groups 
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in Laos (partly borrowed from French — but in changing name perceived 
as derogatory — and from Vietnamese ethnographers). This leads us to 
put into perspective the view that behind the official classifications and 
their evolution, there is a cynical and conscious adjustment at the service 
of a strategy of control; it is not certain that these ethnographers and 
state officials had the means to do that. About these classifications, their 
history and issues, see: Trankell (1998), Evans (1999c, 2000, 2003), 
 Goudineau (2000), Pholsena (2002, 2009), and Ovesen (2004).
6. If most of the groups named Kha were speakers of Mon-Khmer language, 
this is only by chance, and there are exceptions, such as the Phounoy 
or Kheu. These groups speak languages related to the Tibeto-Burman 
family, but because they have lived in Laos for a long time, they were 
called Kha (and then, for a while, considered Mon-Khmer speakers). 
In addition, speaking a language of the same origin does not involve 
sharing common social or cultural traits: the Bid (Mon-Khmer) and 
Seng (Tibeto-Burman) sometimes say they are relatives as they share 
many sociocultural similarities. For a defender of language classifications, 
see Chamberlain (1996); for a critical view, see Matisoff (1983) and 
Evans (1999a). For an overview of the use of such criteria, sometimes 
intersected with genetic data as a basis for historical reconstruction, see 
 Edmonson and Gregerson (2007) and Enfield (2011).
7. In Phongsaly province, exogamous marriages are still rare, and 80 percent 
of villages are mono-ethnic (i.e. over 90 percent of the population 
belong to the same group). The argument often given to justify group 
endogamy is that women from other groups would not know how 
to properly honor the ancestors, because they do not share the same 
 traditions.
8. On the openness of rituals on the outside, see Tapp (2000,) Culas (2004), 
and Sprenger (2011); on territorial rituals, see Condominas (1975), 
 Bouté (2012), and Schlemmer (2012).
9. One should not differentiate too much between plains and mountains, 
by thinking of these areas and their populations as two worlds cut off 
from each other, and see only the first as the natural place for develop-
 ment of the state, while viewing the second as areas of refuge for “demo-
 cratic societies.” The contrast is not as radical; note, for example, that 
the wet rice field-based villages politically organized at the supra-village 
level and villages living from shifting cultivation on the slopes often live 
on the same mountainside and can be only a few hours’ walking dis-
 tance apart. We must also not over-emphasize either the determinant of 
agrarian policy: flooded rice fields do not necessarily require the creation 
of centralized societies (see Hani and Hmong in China), and unequal 
280 Grégoire Schlemmer
relationships can be based on other resources (e.g. salt, slave caravans, 
taxes); see Katchin in Burma or Phounoy in Laos.
10. For diachronic approaches that illustrate these points, see Bouté (2006, 
2010), Goudineau (2008), Évrard and Chiemsisouraj (2011), and 
Badenoch and Shinsuke (2013). Concerning the “taization” process, see 
Izikowitz (1969), Condominas (1990), Evans (2000), and Évrard (2008).
11. These paragraphs are mainly based on information extracted from the 
Commissariat de Luang Phrabang archives (Archives d’Outre-Mer, fonds 
INDOCHINE-Gouvernement général de l’Indochine, Aix-en-Provence, 
France).
12. On this point, and more generally on cultural and religious policies of the 
socialist period and their effects, see Evans (1998b), Goudineau (2001), 
Bouté (2008), Ladwig (2008), and Petit (2013).
13. There is no Lao term to qualify “animism.” Indeed, animism is nothing 
but a catch-all term designating all groups with religious practices that 
do not fit in one of the world’s dominant religions. While sasana phi 
(“religion of spirits”) is widely used today, the expression is not officially 
accepted. Until recently, these two terms were unthinkable together, 
sasana referring to Buddhism and all that precisely does not deal with 
spirits. Buddhist and spirit cults form two domains, but one should not 
perceive as two opposing religions. Being Buddhist is less a profession of 
faith than the respect of specific practices (going to the temple during 
festivals) perfectly combinable with other religious practices, such as 
feeding a spirit to drive away a disease. Actually, many non-Buddhist 
rituals are also performed by the Buddhists. Finally, note that Buddhism 
is not the prerogative of Lao: Lu, Phounoy, part Khmu, Phong, Samtao, 
Xaek, and Xuay also honor the Buddha and represent 20 percent of the 
 Laotian Buddhist community.
14. De facto, this term may not be used instead of “ethnic groups” or 
“minorities”: if some groups are from very ancient settlement, the 
majority of the Sino-Tibetan and Hmong-Mien speaking groups does 
not exceed two centuries. Moreover, locally, anteriority is defined on a 
very small scale (such valley, such river bank). Finally, there is neither 
logic nor moral evident link between anteriority on an area and special 
 privileges. For a different view on this point, see Baird (2008b).
15. On the impact of socio-economical changes on ethnic minorities, see 
Cohen (2000), Lyttleton (2008), Évrard (2011), Bouté (2013), Diana 
 (2013).
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